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I t	is	a	startling	fact	that,	in	Plato’s	corpus,	there	is	not	one	unam-biguous	instance	of	Socrates’	reforming	his	interlocutor’s	way	of	life	by	the	end	of	a	dialogue.	In	fact,	Socrates	seems	often	to	fail	
at	 improving	his	 interlocutors	at	all,	 let	alone	changing	 their	values.	
This	uninspiring	track	record	has	understandably	 led	many	scholars	
to	conclude	that	Socrates	is	a	failure.	Alexander	Nehamas,	e.g.,	writes	
that	 “Plato’s	 works	 do	 not	 at	 all	 show	 that	 Socrates’	 dialogue	 with	
his	fellows	has	…	beneficial	effects.”	He	then	asks	rhetorically,	“How	
could	 Socrates	 claim	 success	 for	 himself	 in	 light	 of	 such	 a	 record?”1 
John	Beversluis	is	more	emphatic:	“…	if	the	early	dialogues	show	any-
thing,	they	show	Socrates’	monumental	failure.”2	Some	scholars	con-
sider	 such	 failure	 to	be	 required	by	 the	moral	psychology	of	Plato’s	
middle	dialogues,	 in	particular	the	tenet	that	strong	desires	can	con-
trol	a	person’s	evaluative	beliefs.3	Dominic	Scott	thinks	that	this	is	re-
sponsible	for	a	Platonic	pessimism	concerning	the	role	of	argument	in	
moral	education,4	and	Raphael	Woolf	writes	that	it	causes	a	“crisis	for	
Socratic	method”.5	Other	scholars	go	further,	claiming	even	that	Plato	
charges	Socrates	with	causing	harm.6	There	is	thus	a	wide	consensus	
among	scholars	that	Socrates	is	wrong	to	trust	in	reason	and	argument	
as	capable	of	converting	people	—	that,	 for	various	reasons,	his	strat-
egy	is	deeply	and	irreparably	flawed.	
In	this	paper,	I	argue	for	the	opposite.	On	my	view,	Socrates’	project	
of	using	reason	and	argument	to	try	to	persuade	his	interlocutors	to	
value	wisdom	the	most	—	what	I	call	his	project	of	philosophical conver-
sion	—	is	not	at	all	misguided,	nor	is	it	depicted	to	be	a	failure,	nor	is	
1.	 Nehamas	1998:	66.	See	also	Nehamas	1999:	70–71.	
2.	 Beversluis	2000:	34.	Cf.	Blondell	2002:	125.
3.	 I	 use	 the	 term	 ‘middle	 dialogues’	 out	 of	 convenience.	 Nothing	 in	 my	 argu-
ment	depends	on	points	of	chronology,	 though,	at	 times,	 I	 concede	a	stan-
dard	ordering	of	the	dialogues	(as,	e.g.,	 in	Vlastos	1991:	46–47)	to	facilitate	
dialogue	with	scholars	partial	to	developmentalism.	
4.	 D.	Scott	1999:	28–32.	
5.	 Woolf	2000:	1,	fn.	1.
6.	 Nussbaum	1980:	88,	Vlastos	1988:	100,	Nehamas	1999:	60–61.	
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only	 to	 instrumental	 reason.	 The	 second	 stage	 still	 involves	 reason	
and	 argument,	 but	 their	 point	 here	 is	 not	 to	 convince	 the	 interlocu-
tor	of	anything:	 it	 is	 rather	 to	cause	 the	experience	of	philosophical	
pleasure,	an	experience	that	can	lead	to	his	valuing	wisdom	the	most.
Now,	 some	 scholars	 have	 recognized	 that,	 in	 the	 first	 place,	
Socrates’	 goal	 is	 often	 to	 motivate	 his	 interlocutors	 just	 to	 do	 more	
philosophy.	For	Thomas	Brickhouse	and	Nicholas	Smith,	for	example,	
Socratic	refutation	is	meant	to	cause	a	person	to	feel	shame,	and	that	
shame	is	then	meant	to	motivate	him	to	do	philosophy	as	a	means	to	
rectify	it.8	Other	scholars	view	Socrates	as	trying	to	motivate	further	
philosophical	inquiry	by	causing	the	experience	of	aporia	or	the	aware-
ness	of	ignorance.9	What	is	missing	from	such	accounts,	however,	is	a	
satisfying	answer	to	why	doing	more	philosophy	would	at	all	be	effec-
tive	at	causing	a	person	to	change	what	he	values	the	most.	As	I	show,	
the	answer	cannot	be	as	simple	as	that	it	would	expose	one	to	reasons	
why	something	else	is	more	valuable.	Like	some	others,	then,	I	view	
Socrates	 as	 aiming	 in	 the	 first	 place	 to	 motivate	 further	 philosophi-
cal	inquiry.	But	what	my	account	provides,	and	what	other	accounts	
lack,	is	an	explanation	of	the	process	of	philosophical	conversion	as	
a	whole.
It	is	an	explanation	that	we	should	find	familiar	and	intuitive.	Often	
a	student	enrolls	in	a	philosophy	course	solely	for	an	instrumental	rea-
son,	e.g.,	to	prepare	for	a	successful	career	in	law,	but,	by	the	end	of	the	
course,	and	for	reasons	that	she	cannot	fully	articulate,	she	finds	her-
self	attracted	to	the	pursuit	of	wisdom,	just	for	itself.	This	is	exactly	the	
sort	of	experience	that	is	at	the	core	of	Socrates’	project	of	philosophi-
cal	conversion.	The	pre-law	student	today	is	the	talented,	ambitious,	
up-and-coming	politician	of	ancient	Athens,	whose	priorities	Socrates	
intends	to	transform	by	first	convincing	him	to	do	philosophy	just	for	
its	instrumental	value.
8.	 See	Brickhouse	and	Smith	1994:	25	and	2000:	58–59.	
9.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Robinson	 1953:	 11,	 Mackenzie	 1988:	 337,	 Benson	 1995:	 89,	 Slings	
1999:	140–141,	Politis	2006:	104,	and	D.	Scott	2006:	72.	
there	any	reason	to	suppose	that	Plato	conceived	of	it	as	such.7	What	
has	misled	scholars	is	the	expectation	that	Socrates	would	be	trying	to	
argue his interlocutors into changing	their	values	—	that	is,	that	he	would	
be	aiming	to	convert	them	by	providing	them	with	reasons	why	wis-
dom	is	more	valuable	than	anything	else,	intending	for	their	conver-
sion	to	happen	as	a	result	of	appreciating	the	force	of	those	reasons.	In	
contrast,	I	show	that	Socrates	employs	a	more	sophisticated	strategy.	
Its	key	component	is	the	use	of	philosophical	argument	not	to	lead	an	
interlocutor	to	rationally conclude that	he	must	change	his	way	of	life	
but	rather	to	cause	him	to	have	a	certain	affective experience,	one	that	
can	be	effective	at	changing	his	beliefs	about	how	best	to	live.	
It	is	worth	noting	that	behind	these	interpretive	issues	concerning	
Socrates	and	Plato	 lies	a	general	philosophical	problem.	Arguments	
can	prove	conclusions,	but	they	can	also	persuade.	They	can	persuade	
a	person	to	adopt	new	means	to	her	avowed	ends,	for	example.	Can	
they	also	persuade	a	person	to	adopt	some	new	ultimate	end,	to	come	
to	value	something	more	than	anything	that	she	currently	values?	Can	
they	persuade	a	person	to	take	up	an	entirely	new	way	of	 life?	 If	so,	
how?
In	the	context	of	Plato’s	dialogues,	I	show	that	Socrates’	project	of	
conversion	is	best	understood	as	a	two-stage	process.	In	the	first	stage,	
Socrates	convinces	his	 interlocutor	of	 the	 instrumental	value	of	wis-
dom,	thus	motivating	him	to	do	philosophy	as	a	means	to	achieving	
some	non-philosophical	goal,	 e.g.,	 advancing	his	 career	or	boosting	
his	reputation.	In	the	second	stage,	this	instrumental	pursuit	is	meant	
to	cause	the	interlocutor	to	experience	the	pleasure	of	philosophical	
inquiry,	an	experience	that	can	reconfigure	his	beliefs	about	the	good.	
The	first	stage	thus	involves	an	appeal	to	reason,	but	 it	 is	an	appeal	
7.	 The	language	of	conversion	is	not	out	of	place	in	scholarship	on	Plato.	See,	e.g.,	
Kahn	1996:	“For	Plato,	and	for	Socrates	as	Plato	represents	him,	the	commit-
ment	to	philosophy	is	conceived	as	something	comparable	to	a	religious	con-
version	….	This	involves	a	radical	restructuring	of	the	personality	in	its	values	
and	priorities”	(273).	The	language	of	transformation is	also	found,	as,	e.g.,	in	
G.	Scott	2000:	Socrates	tries	for	“radical	transformation	in	[his	interlocutors’]	
previous	goals,	desires,	and	preferences”	(102).	
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preference	to	or	as	strongly	as	getting	your	soul	into	the	
best	possible	condition	(29d–30b).10
In	what	way	does	Socrates	want	to	change	what	his	interlocutors	care	
about	 or	 value	 (epimeleisthai)?	 He	 says	 that	 he	 wants	 them	 to	 care	
more	about	the best state of their souls. I	follow	many	interpreters	in	un-
derstanding	the	excellence	of	one’s	soul	to	be	the	condition	of	being	
wise	and,	further,	Socrates	to	want	his	interlocutors	not	to	begin	valu-
ing	wisdom	only	a	bit more	but	more than anything else.11	Additionally,	
Socrates	tries	to	cause	this	change	by	the	use	of	reason	and	arguments.	
10.	 Translations	of	Plato	are	from	John	M.	Cooper	and	D.	S.	Hutchinson,	ed.,	Pla-
to: Complete Works (Indianapolis:	Hackett,	1997),	with	occasional	revision.
11.	 In	fact,	in	the	Apology,	Socrates	lists	wisdom	(sophia, phronēsis),	truth,	the	best	
condition	of	one’s	soul,	excellence	(aretē),	and	the	city	itself	all	as	things	that	
he	wants	people	 to	care	about	more.	Scholars	 typically	consolidate	 the	 list	
by	understanding	the	relevant	excellence	to	be	the	excellence	of	one’s	soul,	
and	 that	 to	 consist	 in	 wisdom,	 that	 is,	 grasping	 the	 truth	 about	 “the	 most	
important	 things”	 (τὰ μέγιστα, Ap. 22d7).	See	Guthrie	1971:	149–150,	Burnet	
1974:	123,	de	Strycker	and	Slings	1994:	332	and	187,	and	Rowe	2007:	75.	This	
consolidation	leaves	out	the	city	itself,	but	it	is	plausible	that,	if	one	values	
wisdom,	then	one	values	also	benefitting	the	city;	see	de	Strycker	and	Slings	
1994:	368.	Thus,	valuing	wisdom	is	most	important	because	valuing	the	other	
things	 either	 reduces	 to	 it	 or	 is	 implied	 by	 it.	 For	 my	 purposes,	 no	 distinc-
tion	between	sophia and	phronēsis is	necessary	(in	fact,	Plato	may	not	distin-
guish	between	them;	see	Burnet	1974:	123),	and	the	content	of	the	relevant	
wisdom	can	be	left	open:	it	can	range,	for	example,	from	a	“human	wisdom”	
that	consists	of	not	believing	that	one	has	knowledge	of	the	most	important	
things	(cf.	Ap. 23a),	to	“moral	knowledge”	(Destrée	2017:	223;	cf.	219	n.7),	to	
a	more	robust	wisdom	consisting	of	knowledge	of	the	forms.	As	for	valuing	
wisdom	 the most,	note	 that	Socrates	 identifies	wisdom	as	one	of	 “the	most	
important	things”	(τὰ πλείστου ἄξια, Ap. 30a1–2),	with	the	implication	that	one	
should	value	something	in	accordance	with	its	importance.	Further,	he	insists	
that	people	ought	to	value	the	excellence	of	their	souls	(i.e.,	wisdom)	more	
than	their	reputations	(29e1),	honor	(29e1),	money	(29d9, 30b1,	41e4),	bodies	
(30a9),	and	possessions	(36c6).	But	since	such	things	are	what	people	tend	
to	value	the	most,	insisting	that	wisdom	ought	to	be	valued	more than	them	is,	
in	effect,	to	insist	that	it	should	be	valued	more	than	anything	else.	See	also	
Ap. 41e2–a1,	where	Socrates	states	that	his	sons	ought	to	value	virtue	(i.e.,	wis-
dom)	the	most,	a	claim	best	understood	not	as	specific	to	his	sons	but	rather	
as	an	instance	of	the	general	principle	that	everyone	ought	to	value	wisdom	
the	most	—	which,	I	hasten	to	add,	need	not	mean	living just like Socrates (see	
Doyle	2012:	42–64),	but	conceivably	could	find	proper	expression	in	a	num-
ber	of	different	activities.
I	proceed	as	follows.	I	begin	by	reviewing	the	three	main	arguments	
that	 scholars	 typically	 advance	 in	 support	 of	 a	 Platonic	 pessimism	
concerning	Socrates’	project	of	philosophical	conversion.	I	argue	that	
none	are	convincing,	and	thus	that	we	should	consider	Socrates’	proj-
ect	anew.	I	go	about	that	in	the	rest	of	the	paper,	aiming	to	show	that	
philosophical	conversion	as	Plato	conceives	of	it	is	meant	to	happen	
not	so	much	by	arguing	a	person	into	accepting	a	new	set	of	values	as	
by	causing	her	to	have	a	certain	affective	experience.	One	result	is	that	
Socrates’	 conversion	 strategy	 is	 not	 only	 consistent	 with	 but	 deeply	
informed	by	Plato’s	moral	psychology.
1. Platonic pessimism? 
In	the	Apology,	Socrates	insists	that	his	goal	is	to	change	his	interlocu-
tors’	values	by	means	of	reason	and	argument:	
…	I	shall	not	cease	to	practice	philosophy,	to	exhort	you	
and	in	my	usual	way	to	point	out	to	any	one	of	you	whom	
I	happen	to	meet:	“Good	Sir	…	are	you	not	ashamed	to	
be	caring	about	[ἐπιμελούμενος]	how	to	get	as	much	mon-
ey,	 reputation,	 and	 honors	 as	 possible,	 while	 as	 for	 get-
ting	as	much	wisdom	and	truth	as	possible,	and	getting	
your	 soul	 into	 the	 best	 condition,	 that	 you	 do	 not	 care	
about	and	do	not	give	any	thought	to	[οὐκ ἐπιμελῇ οὐδὲ 
φροντίζεις]?”	Then,	if	one	of	you	disputes	this	and	says	he	
does	care	[ἐπιμελεῖσθαι],	I	shall	not	let	him	go	at	once	or	
leave	him,	but	I	shall	question	him,	examine	him,	and	test	
him	[ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω],	and	if	I	do	not	
think	he	has	attained	the	excellence	that	he	says	he	has,	I	
shall	reproach	him	because	he	attaches	little	importance	
to	the	most	 important	 things	and	greater	 importance	to	
inferior	 things.	 …	 For	 I	 go	 around	 doing	 nothing	 other	
than	persuading	both	young	and	old	among	you	not	 to	
care	 about	 [ἐπιμελεῖσθαι]	 your	 body	 or	 your	 wealth	 in	
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interlocutors	tend	to	become	angry	and	impatient,	frequently	refusing	
to	continue	the	discussion	or	attempting	in	some	way	to	sabotage	or	
shorten	it.	On	the	basis	of	this	evidence,	some	scholars	conclude	that	
Plato	thinks	that	Socrates’	project	is	a	failure.14
Suppose,	however,	that	Plato	believed	that	convincing	a	person	to	
dedicate	 himself	 to	 the	 pursuit	 of	 wisdom	 takes	 significant	 time,	 es-
pecially	in	an	age,	not	unlike	our	own,	when	success	for	most	people	
means	money,	power,	and	fame.	If	so,	then	he	would	not	be	inclined	to	
portray	Socrates	converting	an	interlocutor	to	the	life	of	philosophy	by	
the	end	of	any	dialogue,	since	he	would	not	believe	that	such	change	
realistically	could	result	from	just	one	conversation.	Is	there	any	evi-
dence	for	attributing	this	belief	to	Plato?	
Yes.	Consider	the	spot	in	the	corpus	where	Plato	most	directly	de-
scribes	 a	 case	 of	 value	 transformation,	 the	 ascent	 in	 Republic	 7.	 The	
passage	is	notoriously	difficult	to	interpret,	but	here	I	rely	only	on	two	
points.15	The	first	is	that	ascending	changes	the	prisoner’s	values.	At	
the	start,	he	is	deeply	confused	about	what	is	of	ultimate	importance,	
believing	that	“the	truth	is	nothing	other	than	the	shadows”	that	flicker	
across	the	cave	wall	(515c).	By	the	end,	he	sees	for	the	first	time	the	sun,	
which	represents	the	form	of	the	good,	and	as	a	result	his	values	are	
to	be	an	exception,	but,	as	Collins	2015	argues,	Clinias’	vow	at	282d2–3	 is	
ambiguous.	The	πάνυ μὲν οὖν may	indicate	less	of	a	wholehearted	agreement	
to	pursue	philosophy	and	more	of	an	ambivalence:	“a	witness	would	not	be	
able	to	determine	exactly	what	it	is	that	Clinias	is	affirming	and	how	far	his	
commitment	 goes”	 (97).	 Additionally,	 Socrates’	 first	 protreptic	 goes	 no	 fur-
ther	than	presenting	wisdom	as	of	the	highest	instrumental	value,	valuable	
for	the	sake	of	knowing	how	to	use	things	rightly,	and	thus,	even	if	Clinias’	
agreement	were	wholehearted,	 it	 is	not	obvious	that	 it	would	indicate	that	
he	now	values	wisdom	the	most.	As	for	his	behavior	later	in	the	dialogue,	see	
Crito’s	disbelief	that	it	was	actually	Clinias	who	spoke	so	impressively,	and	
Socrates’	confession	that	he	may	in	fact	be	misremembering	(290d–291a;	cf.	
Chance	1992:	123–124).	
14.	 For	 scholars	 who	 infer	 that	 Socrates’	 project	 is	 a	 failure	 from	 the	 fact	 that	
Socrates	 is	never	shown	to	convert	an	 interlocutor	outright,	see	Beversluis	
2000:	34,	Nehamas	1998:	66	and	1999:	70–71,	G.	Scott	2000:	174,	and	Blondell	
2002:	125.	
15.	 For	general	discussion,	see,	e.g.,	Annas	1981:	242–271,	Wilberding	2004,	and	
Barney	2008.	
He	notes	that	he	questions	(eresthai),	examines	(exetazein),	and	tests	
(elenchein)	his	interlocutors,	and,	in	many	dialogues,	Plato	depicts	him	
using	 these	 tactics	 and	 also	 others	 (e.g.,	 humbling,	 impersonation,	
exhortation,	and	protreptic)	in	service	to	converting	them.12	Socrates	
thus	uses	reason	and	arguments	to	try	to	change	what	his	 interlocu-
tors	value	the	most.	How	did	Plato	think	he	could	achieve	that?	
Many	 scholars	 believe	 that	 Plato	 thought	 nothing	 of	 the	 sort.	 In	
this	section,	I	review	the	three	most	common	arguments	that	Plato	is	
deeply	pessimistic	about	the	viability	of	Socrates’	project	of	philosoph-
ical	conversion.	I	show	that	these	arguments	are	either	inconclusive	or	
rely	on	misinterpretations	of	the	text.	
The	 first	 argument,	 the	 Argument	 from	 Socrates’	 Track	 Record,	
begins	from	the	observation	that,	as	mentioned,	there	is	not	one	un-
ambiguous	instance	in	Plato’s	corpus	of	an	interlocutor’s	responding	
to	Socrates’	arguments	with	a	decision	radically	to	reform	his	way	of	
life.13	In	fact,	Socrates	often	falls	far	short	of	achieving	that	result.	His	
12.	 It	is	widely	held	that	several	of	Plato’s	dialogues	depict	Socrates	trying	to	ac-
complish	the	project	that	he	outlines	in	the	Apology.	See	Irwin	1995:	7;	Benson	
2000:	24,	26,	32;	Weiss	2006:	243–53	at	243;	and	Rowe	2007:	89.	For	an	op-
posing	view,	see	Doyle	2012:	64–71.	For	an	overview	of	Socrates’	argumen-
tative	methods,	see	the	collected	papers	in	G.	Scott,	ed.,	Does Socrates Have 
a Method?: Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond (University	
Park:	Penn	State	University	Press,	2002).	In	this	paper,	I	am	concerned	with	
Socrates’	effects	only	on	those	interlocutors	whose	values	are	askew	and	thus	
stand	in	need	of	conversion,	as	Socrates	outlines	it	in	the	Apology,	and	more	
specifically	on	those	whom	Socrates	in	some	way	tries	to	convert	in	the	dia-
logues.	There	is	room	for	disagreement	about	who	falls	into	this	group,	and	
my	overall	argument	does	not	depend	on	any	one	particular	set	of	members.	
Nevertheless,	 I	 tend	to	consider	 it	as	 including	the	 following	 interlocutors:	
Euthyphro,	 Alcibiades,	 Clinias,	 Charmides,	 Critias,	 Laches,	 Nicias,	 Hippias,	
Ion,	Hippothales,	Lysis,	Euthydemus,	Dionysodorus,	Meno,	Protagoras,	Pha-
edrus,	Gorgias,	Polus,	Callicles,	and	Thrasymachus.	
13.	 One	 might	 suppose	 the	 Phaedrus	 to	 be	 an	 exception,	 but,	 as	 Yunis	 2011:	 4	
rightly	notes,	even	by	the	end	of	 the	dialogue,	Phaedrus	remains	 foremost	
committed	to	gaining	rhetorical	fame	and	expertise.	Belfiore	2012	thinks	that,	
by	the	end	of	the	Alcibiades,	Socrates	has	convinced	Alcibiades	that	his	true	
desire	is	to	gain	“the	power	to	rule	correctly	in	the	city,	by	imparting	excel-
lence	to	the	citizens”	(51),	but	this	overlooks	that,	even	then,	Alcibiades’	pri-
mary	motivation	is	still	to	acquire	fame	and	power,	and	becoming	excellent,	
for	him,	is	valuable	just	as	a	vehicle	to	those.	Clinias	also	might	be	thought	
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dialogues,	in	large	part,	depict	only	the	first	stage,	at	the	end	of	which	
an	interlocutor	is	not	meant	to	be	fully	converted	to	valuing	wisdom	
the	most.17 
The	 second	 argument,	 the	 Argument	 from	 Republic	 7,	 relies	 on	
a	 particular	 reading	 of	 a	 well-known	 passage,	 in	 which	 Plato	 has	
Socrates	criticize	an	unnamed	“questioner”	for	causing	young	people	
harm	by	refuting	them.	
And	then	a	questioner	comes	along	and	asks	someone	of	
this	sort	[i.e.,	someone	properly	brought	up],	‘What	is	the	
fine?’	And,	when	he	answers	what	he	has	heard	from	the	
traditional	lawgiver,	the	argument	refutes	him	[ἐξελέγχῃ],	
and	by	refuting	him	often	and	in	many	places	shakes	him	
from	his	convictions,	and	makes	him	believe	that	the	fine	
is	no	more	fine	than	shameful,	and	the	same	with	the	just,	
the	good,	and	the	things	he	honored	most.	…	And	so,	I	
suppose,	 from	 being	 law-abiding	 he	 becomes	 lawless	
(538d–539a).
The	passage	continues:
So,	if	you	don’t	want	your	thirty-year-olds	to	be	objects	of	
such	pity	[for	turning	lawless],	you’ll	have	to	be	extreme-
ly	 careful	 about	 how	 you	 introduce	 them	 to	 arguments.	
…	And	isn’t	it	one	lasting	precaution	not	to	let	them	taste	
arguments	while	they’re	young?	I	don’t	suppose	it	has	es-
caped	your	notice	that,	when	young	people	get	their	first	
taste	of	arguments,	they	misuse	it	by	treating	it	as	a	kind	
17.	 It	will	not	do,	then,	to	object	that,	while	Plato may	think	that	radically	reform-
ing	a	person’s	values	takes	significant	time,	he	depicts	Socrates	 trying	to	ac-
complish	this	in	just	a	single	conversation,	and	thus	Socrates must	believe	that	
conversion	could	happen	relatively	quickly	—	a	 false	belief	by	Plato’s	 lights.	
What	 the	objection	misses	 is	 that,	 for	 the	most	part,	Plato	does	not	depict	
Socrates	directly	or	immediately	trying	to	change	his	interlocutors’	values.	Cf.	
Szlezák	1999,	who	notes	that,	while	the	dialogues	are	meant	to	portray	ascent,	
they	“always	illustrate	only	one	section	of	the	ascent	and	make	the	intentional	
limitations	of	the	process	very	clear”	(61).	
transformed:	he	regards	as	unimportant	the	honors	and	prizes	that	he	
once	admired	(516c–d),	and	now	he	understands	what	 is	really	“the	
cause	of	all	that	is	correct	and	beautiful	in	everything”	(517b).	
The	second	point	is	that	the	ascent	occurs	not	all	at	once	but	rather	
in	stages:	first	the	prisoner	is	unshackled;	then	he	is	made	to	stand	up,	
turn	around,	walk,	look	towards	the	light,	and	begin	ascending.	Finally	
he	sees	the	sun	(515c–d).	In	fact,	what	is	most	salient	about	the	image	
of	an	ascent	—	what	plausibly	led	Plato	to	choose	it	rather	than	some	
other	image	to	illustrate	the	process	of	value	transformation	—	is	that	it	
consists	of	levels	that	are	progressed	through	over	time.	It	would	thus	
appear	that	Plato	does	consider	radical	change	to	a	person’s	values	not	
to	happen	all	at	once	but	rather	to	require	advancing	through	distinct	
stages.16	And	if	that	is	so,	then	we	can	explain	why	Plato	never	depicts	
Socrates	as	reforming	his	interlocutor’s	way	of	life	by	the	end	of	any	
dialogue	without	having	to	suppose	that	he	regarded	Socrates’	project	
to	be	a	 failure.	The	explanation	 is	 just	 that	Plato	believed	 that	such	
radical	change	requires	more	than	the	length	of	conversation	that	rea-
sonably	could	be	depicted	in	a	dialogue.	There	is	additional	evidence	
for	this	point	in	the	Apology and	Gorgias.	 In	both	dialogues,	Socrates	
insists	 that	 a	 longer	 discussion	 eventually	 would	 persuade	 his	 audi-
ence.	His	jurors	would	be	persuaded	to	acquit	him	(Ap. 37a–b),	and	
Callicles	to	reform	his	way	of	life	(Grg. 513b–c).	Plato	seems	to	hold	the	
reasonable	belief	 that	persuasion	about	matters	of	 importance	takes	
considerable	time.
It	is	thus	too	quick	to	infer	from	Socrates’	depicted	track	record	that	
Plato	considers	his	project	of	philosophical	conversion	to	be	a	failure.	
An	alternative	explanation	is	available,	one	that,	to	my	mind,	we	have	
every	reason	at	 this	point	 to	 think	 is	equally	plausible.	 I	shall	argue	
soon	 that	 we	 should	 favor	 it.	 For	 Plato	 does	 in	 fact	 regard	 Socrates’	
project	 as	 meant	 to	 happen	 in	 distinct	 stages	 over	 time,	 and	 the	
16.	 Cf.	G.	Scott	2000:	“Plato	does	not	seem	to	allow	the	possibility	of	a	sudden,	
complete	 ‘conversion’	 of	 human	 character”	 (167).	 That	 Plato	 thinks	 value	
transformation	 takes	significant	 time	 is	 supported	also	by	 the	seed-sowing	
metaphor	at	Phaedrus 276b–277a.	
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believed,	but	is	now	making	clear	—	that	argument	is	ineffective	at	the	
task	of	improving	people,	let	alone	reforming	their	ways	of	life.19 On	
this	reading,	then,	the	passage	from	book	7,	quoted	above,	is	simply	a	
further	step	in	the	same	direction:	not	only	is	argument	ineffective	—	it	
is	also	damaging.	
But	is	the	passage	a	criticism	of	Socrates?	(Let	us	leave	aside	that,	
if	so,	we	would	have	Socrates	criticizing	himself	for	causing	harm,	and	
without	any	apparent	awareness	of	that:	after	all,	Socrates	is	the	one	
voicing	 these	complaints.)	Two	passages	elsewhere	should	make	us	
hesitate.	In	the	Apology,	Plato	has	Socrates	argue	that	he	has	not	cor-
rupted	the	young	(33d–34b),	while	also	having	Socrates	admit	that	he	
refutes	all	types	(23b;	cf.	33a,	37d)	and	that	young	people	now	imitate	
him	(23c)	—	the	exact	sort	of	behavior	that	should	be	corrupting,	if	the	
current	interpretation	of	the	Republic 7	passage	is	correct.	Further,	in	
the	Sophist,	a	dialogue	considered	to	postdate	the	Republic,	Plato	is	en-
thusiastic	about	the	benefits	of	refutation.	It	is	“the	principal	and	most	
important	kind	of	cleansing”,	and	it	is	a	necessary	preliminary	to	learn-
ing:	“the	soul	…	won’t	get	any	advantage	[ὄνησιν]	from	any	learning	
that’s	offered	 to	 it	until	 someone	shames	 it	by	 refuting	 it	…”	 (230c–
d).	Not	only	is	there	no	mention	of	any	need	to	restrict	refutation	to	
adults	—	it	would	seem	that,	by	the	Sophist’s lights,	it	is	Socrates’	young 
interlocutors	who	especially	need	to	be	refuted.	Otherwise	whatever	
learning	they	acquire	will	not	benefit	them.
Now,	 it	 would	 be	 unpersuasive	 to	 argue	 that,	 because	 of	 Plato’s	
views	 elsewhere,	 the	 Republic	 7	 passage	 must	 not	 be	 saying	 what	 it	
seems	to	say,	i.e.,	that	those	who	refute	young	people	are	at	fault.	But	
Plato’s	views	elsewhere	do	motivate	a	reconsideration	of	the	passage.	
And	what	one	notices	upon	reconsideration	is	that	not	refuting	young	
people	 is	 presented	 only	 as	 one precaution	 a	 person	 might	 take	 to	
avoid	the	risk	of	inducing	moral	cynicism:	“…	isn’t	it	one	[μία]	lasting	
precaution	not	to	let	them	taste	arguments	while	they’re	young?”20	The	
19.	 See,	e.g.,	Klosko	1983,	D.	Scott	1999:	15,	and	Woolf	2000:	32–40.	
20.	On	the	phrase	‘taste	arguments’	(τῶν λόγων	…	γεύεσθαι),	cf.	Alc. 1 114a.	
of	game	of	 contradiction.	They	 imitate	 those	who’ve	 re-
futed	them	by	refuting	others	themselves	….	Then,	when	
they’ve	refuted	many	and	been	refuted	by	them	in	turn,	
they	 forcefully	 and	 quickly	 fall	 into	 disbelieving	 what	
they	believed	before	(539a–b).
Many	 scholars	 think	 that	 the	 criticism	 in	 this	 passage	 applies	 to	
Socrates.	It	is	not	difficult	to	see	why.	Socrates	routinely	exposes	young	
people	to	examination,	both	by	refuting	them	and	by	refuting	others	
in	 their	 presence.	 Worse,	 he	 seems	 implicated	 on	 a	 second	 score:	 a	
group	of	young	people	have	in	fact	taken	to	imitating	him	by	refuting	
others	themselves	(see	Apology 23c).	It	can	thus	seem	that,	as	Martha	
Nussbaum	writes,	“the	characterization	of	the	practice	found	danger-
ous	points	unambiguously	to	Socrates.	…	[The]	identification	[is]	be-
yond	 reasonable	 doubt.”18	 If	 that	 is	 correct,	 then	 the	 passage	 would	
go	a	long	way	towards	showing	that	Plato	is	deeply	pessimistic	about	
Socrates’	ability	to	use	arguments	to	 improve	people,	since	it	would	
amount	to	Plato’s	condemning	Socrates	for	causing	more	harm	than	
benefit	—	specifically,	for	instilling	in	young	people	a	moral	cynicism,	
such	 that	 they	 lose	conviction	 in	 the	 fundamental	claims	of	conven-
tional	morality.	
Before	continuing,	is	worth	noting	how	well	this	interpretation	fits	
with	a	familiar	way	of	reading	the	Republic,	namely	as	a	parting	of	ways	
between	Plato	and	Socrates	on	the	topic	of	moral	education.	The	Re-
public begins	in	book	1	with	Socrates’	spectacular	failure	to	convince	
Thrasymachus	of	the	value	of	justice.	Argument	seems	to	achieve	no	
good.	Then,	in	books	2	and	3,	a	way	of	moral	education	is	proposed	
that	centers	on	art	and	gymnastics.	Argument	is	wholly	absent.	Why?	
A	 common	 answer	 is	 that	 Plato	 now	 believes	—	or	 perhaps	 always	
18.	 Nussbaum	1980:	88.	She	continues:	“Plato	charges	his	teacher	(ironically,	in	
his	teacher’s	own	persona)	with	contributing	to	moral	decline	by	not	restrict-
ing	the	questioning-process	to	a	chosen,	well-trained	few.”	Cf.	Vlastos	1988,	
who	writes	that	Socrates	gives	“premature	exposure”	to	inquiry	about	right	
and	 wrong	 (100);	 and	 Nehamas	 1999:	 Socrates	 teaches	 argument	 “to	 very	
young	men”,	which	risks	producing	in	them	an	“agnosticism	or	even	cynicism”	
(60–61).
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Socrates’	project	of	philosophical	conversion.	The	passage	is	not	a	crit-
icism	of	Socrates.		
The	third	argument	is	more	complicated	than	the	previous	two.	It	
begins	from	the	thought	that,	at	 least	 in	the	middle	dialogues,	Plato	
recognizes	that	certain	desires	have	the	ability	to	determine	our	evalu-
ative	beliefs.	It	then	seeks	to	show	that	Socrates	is	unable	to	change	
those	desires,	and	so	is	unable	to	change	the	beliefs	that	they	control.	
I	consider	just	one	version	of	this	argument	here,	a	version	put	for-
ward	by	Raphael	Woolf.	 I	 call	 it	 the	Argument	 from	  Erōs. Woolf	ob-
serves	that,	at	best,	Socratic	argument	can	only	ever	convince	a	person	
that	he	should	adopt	some	belief	because	the	reasons	support	doing	
so.	What	 it	 cannot	do	 is	 instill	 in	him	 the	disposition	 to	change	his	
beliefs	in	accordance	with	the	reasons.	What	is	required	for	that is	that	
one’s	desires	be	rightly	directed	—	more	specifically,	that	a	person	have	 
erōs for	“logical	consistency”	(28;	cf.	32).	If	a	person’s	erōs is	misdirect-
ed	—	if	it	is	for	anything	besides that	—	then	he	will	cling	to	his	favored	
evaluative	beliefs	even	if	his	reasoning	shows	them	to	be	false.	Thus,	
no	amount	of	argument	will	be	effective	at	changing	them.	
Is	 it	 true	 that	Plato	 thinks	of	misdirected	erōs	 as	an	obstacle	 that	
Socrates	cannot	overcome?	He	certainly	thinks	of	it	as	an	obstacle.	As	
Woolf	notes,	Plato	has	Socrates	diagnose	Callicles’	erōs	as	the	reason	
why,	 despite	 being	 unable	 to	 refute	 Socrates’	 arguments,	 he	 refuses	
to	change	his	beliefs	(Grg. 513b–c).	This	passage	is	important,	as	it	is	
the	only	spot	 in	Plato’s	corpus	where	Socrates	diagnoses	 the	reason	
why	an	 interlocutor	has	 failed	 to	be	convinced	by	his	arguments	 in	
the	here	and	now.	However,	 immediately	after	 saying	 that	Callicles’	
erōs	 is	to	blame,	Socrates	insists	that	Callicles	would	be	persuaded	if	
they	examined	the	same	matters	“often	and	in	a	better	way”	(513c).	Ap-
parently,	then,	erōs	is	not	an	insurmountable	obstacle	for	Socrates.	To	
get	the	better	of	it,	though,	a	better	sort	of	argument	is	needed	(e.g.,	a	
less	confrontational	one),	and	the	issue	in	dispute	must	be	repeatedly	
considered.	
It	 is	 possible,	 of	 course,	 to	 regard	 Socrates’	 optimism	 here	 as	 na-
ive	—	tempting,	 even,	 to	 suppose	 that	 Plato	 intends	 for	 us	 to	 see	 it	
passage	thus	excuses	a	person	who	takes	some	other	suitable	precau-
tion.	The	question	is	whether	Socrates	does.	
The	answer	is	yes.	Whenever	he	refutes	young	people,	as	well	as	
whenever	a	young	person	is	a	bystander	to	a	refutation,	Socrates	con-
sistently	 acts	 to	 ensure	 that	 any	 growing	 moral	 cynicism	 is	 quickly	
uprooted.	Far	from	trying	to	unsettle	his	interlocutors’	convictions	in	
the	fundamental	claims	of	conventional	morality,	he	insists	that	such	
claims	are	true:	that	virtue	is	good,	vice	is	bad,	and	virtue	and	vice	are	
opposites.21	 Further,	 in	 places	 where	 an	 interlocutor’s	 definition	 im-
plies	 that	virtue	 is	not	good,	Socrates	responds	by	 insisting	 that	 the	
implication	alone	refutes	the	definition.22	Such	insistence	might	mean	
little	if	young	people	were	distrustful	of	Socrates,	but	Plato	depicts	just	
the	opposite.	He	depicts	young	people	trusting	and	admiring	Socrates,	
even	consulting	him	for	important	life	guidance.23	Socrates’	repeated	
insistence	 that	 the	 fundamental	 claims	of	 conventional	morality	are	
true,	then,	is	precisely	the	sort	of	conversational	move	that	would	act	
as	a	suitable	precaution	against	moral	cynicism	arising	in	them.	More-
over,	 it	 makes	 sense	 that	 the	 recommended	 precaution	 in	 the	 pas-
sage	—	just don’t refute young people	—	is	maximally	cautious.	The	risked	
harm	is	serious,	and	Plato’s	advice	is	for	practitioners	of	argument	in	
general.	But	there	are	exceptions	to	general	advice,	and	Socrates’	case	
is	one	of	them.	He	is	“extremely	careful”	in	an	alternative	way.24	It	is	
thus	mistaken	to	use	Republic	7	to	motivate	a	Platonic	pessimism	about	
21.	 Virtue	is	good:	Charm. 159c,	161a,	163e,	175b,	176a;	Laches	190b–c;	Alc.	1	109c,	
115e,	 116c–d,	 133b,	 134a–135c;	 Euthyd.	 279b;	 Prot.	 332a–b,	 349e;	 Grg.	 493d,	
498c,	504d–e,	506e–507a,	507a–c,	527d;	Meno 73b–c, 87d–e,	98e;	Rep. 1.353e–
354a.	 Vice	 is	 bad:	 Alc. 1	 115d,	 135c;	 Euthyd. 281d–e;	 Prot. 332a–b;	 Grg. 469b,	
470e,	472d–473b,	477e,	479c,	498c,	505b,	507a–c,	521b,	522e;	Rep. 1.353e–354a.	
Virtue	and	vice	are	opposites:	Prot. 332d–e,	359e,	360d;	Grg. 507a–c.	
22. Charm. 160d,	161b,	175b,	176a;	Laches 192d,	193d;	Prot. 350b.	Cf.	H. Mi. 376b–c,	
where	Socrates	refuses	to	believe	that	the	one	who	voluntarily	acts	unjustly	
is	the	good	person,	despite	the	argument	seeming	to	show	that.	
23.	 See,	e.g.,	Lach. 180e–181a,	Alc. 1 124b,	Prot. 313c,	Lys. 205a,	and	Phdr. 269c–d.
24.	 In	fact,	he	is	extremely	careful	in	more	than	one	way.	He	also	refutes	those	
who	 target	people’s	 inherited,	 fundamental	moral	 convictions,	 such	as	Cal-
licles	and	Thrasymachus.	
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change	a	person’s	values,	then	Socrates’	claim	that	erōs has	disposed	
Alcibiades	favorably to	the	conversation	would	make	little,	if	any,	sense.	
For	 Socrates’	 purpose	 in	 the	 dialogue	 is	 explicitly	 to	 convert	 Alcibi-
ades	 to	 virtue	 and	 the	 cultivation	 of	 himself	 through	 philosophical	
conversation	(132b–133c,	134b–135e;	cf.	124b–c,	127e).	At	bottom,	then,	
Socrates’	 claim	 is	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 Alcibiades’	 case,	 a	 misplaced	 erot-
ic	 attachment	 is	 a	 prerequisite for	 being	 improved	 by	 means	 of	 argu-
ment	—	the	opposite	of	the	claim	that	erōs condemns	such	a	project	to	
failure.28
So	we	return	to	the	start.	If,	as	I	have	argued,	there	is	no	good	rea-
son	 to	 suppose	 that	 Plato	 rejects	 Socrates’	 project	 of	 philosophical 
conversion,	how	does	he	think	that	it	can	succeed?	How	can	Socratic	
argument	change	what	a	person	values	the	most?	I	turn	to	this	ques-
tion	in	the	next	two	sections.
2. Indirect route
In	 the	Apology,	Socrates	outlines	a	project	of	using	reason	and	argu-
ment	to	persuade	his	interlocutors	to	value	wisdom	the	most.	How	is	
that	project	meant	to	go?	In	this	section,	I	present	the	first	stage	of	it.	I	
argue	that	Socrates’	immediate	aim	with	his	interlocutors	is	typically	
to	 motivate	 them	 to	 pursue	 wisdom	 only	 for	 its	 instrumental	 value,	
and,	further,	that	such	a	limited	aim	is	explained	by	Plato’s	conviction	
that	a	more	ambitious	attempt	is	likely	to	fail.	
28.	Of	course,	Socrates’	claim	would	mean	little	if	it	were	shown	to	be	false	—	if,	
e.g.,	Plato	were	to	depict	Alcibiades’	erōs nonetheless	interfering	with	Socrates’	
attempts	to	persuade	him.	What	Plato	depicts,	however,	is	Socrates	convinc-
ing	Alcibiades	that,	unless	he	gains	wisdom,	he	will	not	be	able	to	acquire	
the	fame	that	he	intensely	desires	(see	especially	105e,	108e–109a,	and	116d–
118b).	 Socrates	 succeeds,	 then,	 not	 despite Alcibiades’	 erōs but	 because	 of	 it:	
he	succeeds	by	exploiting	its	motivational	power	to	turn	Alcibiades	towards	
philosophy.	One	might	object	still	that	the	historical	Alcibiades	is	a	failed	case,	
and	thus	Plato	must	have	meant	for	us	to	regard	Socrates’	confidence	in	his	
ability	to	persuade	Alcibiades	as	misguided.	There	is	a	real	question,	howev-
er,	about	what	Plato	means	for	us	to	conclude	about	Socrates	from	his	many	
depictions	of	Alcibiades.	See	Sheffield	(forthcoming)	for	the	argument	that	
Plato	depicts	Alcibiades	making	moral	progress	in	the	corpus,	and	thus	that,	
by	Plato’s	lights,	Socrates	was	a	considerable	success	with	Alcibiades.	
as	such,	given	that	Callicles	shows	few	signs	of	budging.25	However,	
Plato	is	committed	to	the	thought	that	repeated	arguments	have	a	per-
suasive	power	that	isolated	arguments	lack	—	that	repeated	arguments	
succeed	where	isolated	arguments	fail,	including	in	disputes	about	the	
best	way	to	live.26	In	fact,	so	much	would	seem	to	be	implied	by	the	
extended	 analogy	 in	 the	 Gorgias between	 the	 medical	 craft	 and	 the	
true	political	craft	(see	especially	521a–522b).	Often	a	single	medical	
treatment	is	not	enough	to	restore	health	to	the	body.	Likewise,	Plato	
thinks,	with	arguments	and	the	health	of	the	soul:	repeated	doses	are	
needed.	It	is	thus	implausible	that	Plato	means	for	us	to	see	Socrates’	
optimism	as	misguided.
There	 is	 a	 further	 reason	 for	 supposing	 that	 erōs is	 not	 an	 insur-
mountable	obstacle	for	Socrates.	It	concerns	the	timing	of	his	first	in-
teraction	with	Alcibiades.	In	the	Alcibiades,	Socrates	says	that,	though	
he	 has	 been	 observing	 Alcibiades	 for	 many	 years,	 he	 is	 deciding	 to	
talk	with	him	now	because	only	now	is	he	ready	to	listen	(Alc. 1	105e–
106a;	cf.	124c).	Remarkably,	what	has	made	Alcibiades	ready	to	listen	
is	 his	 ambition	 (105a),	 ambition	 that	 Socrates	 later	 characterizes	 as	
erōs	for	fame	(124b4–6).	Socrates’	claim,	then,	is	that,	before	Alcibiades	
developed	such	erōs,	conversation	with	him	would	have	been	“point-
less”	(μάτην,	105e);	under	the	influence	of	erōs,	however,	he	is	ready	to	
listen	(νῦν γὰρ	…	μου ἀκούσαις,	106a).27 
Now,	 if	 misplaced	 erōs — i.e.,	 to	 go	 along	 with	 Woolf,	 erōs for	
anything	 besides	 logical	 consistency,	 such	 as	 Alcibiades’	 erōs for	
fame	—	poses	insurmountable	obstacles	for	the	ability	of	argument	to	
25.	 Woolf,	e.g.,	refers	to	Socrates’	optimism	as	an	“act	of	faith”	(31).	See	also	Klos-
ko	1983,	who	likewise	interprets	it	as	a	statement	of	“faith,”	one	that	distances	
Plato	from	Socrates:	“as	Plato	is	well	aware,	Socrates	is	fighting	against	forces	
that	are	too	powerful	for	him	…	[Socrates]	is	inevitably	destined	to	lose”	(593,	
586).	Cf.	Plochmann	and	Robinson	1988:	201.
26.	See	Ap. 37a–b,	Tht. 177a–b,	and	Symp. 221e–222a.	
27.	 It	is	disputed	whether	the	Alcibiades is	written	by	Plato,	though	scholars	are	
increasingly	 in	 favor	 of	 its	 authenticity.	 See	 Denyer	 2001:	 14–26	 and	 Jirsa	
2009	for,	to	my	mind,	convincing	rebuttals	to	authorial	skepticism,	and	Smith	
2004	for	an	opposing	view.	
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The	 second	 concerns	 a	 problem	 with	 trying	 to	 decide	 on	 the	 ba-
sis	of	reasons	what	to	value	the	most.	 In	book	9	of	the	Republic,	Pla-
to	 considers	 how,	 in	 general,	 we	 answer	 questions	 about	 value.	 He	
thinks	 that	 each	 of	 us	 uses	 a	 certain	 “criterion”	 (κριτήριον,	 582a)	 or	
“instrument”	 (ὄργανον,	 582d)	when	 judging	 things	 to	be	valuable	 (cf.	
ἐπῄνει	 …	 καὶ ἔψεγεν,	 582e).	 In	 particular,	 we	 use	 what	 we	 value	 the	
most,	and	we	judge	things	to	be	valuable	 in	 light	of	 it.	The	 lover	of	
profit	(ὁ φιλοκερδὴς),	e.g.,	makes	judgments	based	on	wealth	and	prof-
it	(πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει … ἐκρίνετο),	 i.e.,	he	judges	things	to	be	valuable,	
in	the	end,	insofar	as	they	promote	wealth.	So,	too,	with	the	lover	of	
honor	(ὁ φιλότιμός):	his	evaluative	judgments	are	based	on	honor	and	
victory	and	courage	(τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ).
The	 problem	 arises	 when	 trying	 to	 convince	 a	 person	 on	 the	 ba-
sis	of	reasons	to	change	what	he	values	the	most.	To	do	so,	he	must	
evaluate	those	reasons	as	showing	that	something	else	is	more	valu-
able.	But	 this	would	seemingly	never	happen,	 since	what	he	values	
the	most	is	the	final	arbiter	for	him	of	what	is	valuable.	The	result	is	a	
sort	of	evaluative	inertia:	the	lover	of	profit	will	dismiss	the	prospect	of	
anything’s	being	more	valuable	than	money,	since,	for	him,	things	are	
valuable	in	the	end	just	insofar	as	they	promote	gaining	money.	And	
likewise	in	other	cases:	what	a	person	values	the	most	will	act	as	the	
final	arbiter	for	him	of	what	is	valuable,	and	thus	he	will	not	evaluate	
the	reasons	as	showing	that	some	object	is	more	valuable	than	what	
he	currently	most	values.31
just	as	likely	to	be	seen	by	him	as	a	refutation	of	his	newfound	conception	
of	virtue	as	of	his	conception	of	the	good	—	more	likely,	even,	as	Plato	seems	
to	think	that,	of	all	one’s	beliefs,	it	is	one’s	belief	about	what	the	good	is	that	
one	holds	most	strongly.	All	other	beliefs	conform	to	 it	(see	especially	Rep. 
8.553c–d	and	560a–e;	cf.	Phil. 12a and	Rep. 9.582d–e).	
31.	 In	Plato’s	corpus,	evaluative	inertia	is	expressed	most	forcefully	by	Protarchus:	
“To	my	mind,	absolutely	[πάντως],	pleasure	wins	and	always	will	win	[as	the	
good]”	(Phil. 12a).	It	 is	found	also	with	Polus,	who	rejects	out	of	hand	argu-
ments	that	conflict	with	valuing	power	the	most	(Grg. 473e,	480e);	with	Cal-
licles,	who	does	the	same	in	response	to	arguments	that	conflict	with	valuing	
pleasure	 the	 most	 (Grg. 494a–b,	 511a,	 513c,	 521b);	 and	 with	 Thrasymachus,	
who	acts	in	the	same	manner	when	Socrates	argues	against	the	value	of	pow-
er	and	wealth	(Rep. 1.350d,	354a).	In	each	case,	what	seems	to	be	happening	
Suppose	 you	 want	 to	 convince	 a	 person	 that	 she	 should	 value	 x 
more	than	anything	that	she	currently	values.	One	natural	way	to	pro-
ceed	would	be	 to	provide	her	with	reasons	why	 the	 things	 that	she	
values	now	are	not	so	important,	and	why,	in	contrast,	x	is	of	ultimate	
importance.	Call	such	an	approach	direct,	in	virtue	of	its	attempting	to	
argue	a	person	into	a	new	position	(e.g.,	the	position	of	valuing	x	more	
than	anything	else)	by	presenting	her	with	reasons	to	accept	it.	
For	 two	reasons,	Plato	must	have	 thought	 that	a	direct	approach	
would	face	serious	problems	when	the	task	came	to	persuading	a	per-
son	to	change	what	he	values	the	most.	
The	 first	 concerns	 the	 drama	 of	 the	 Gorgias	 and	 Republic. When	
Socrates	 contests	 the	 ways	 of	 life	 of	 Polus,	 Callicles,	 and	 Thrasyma-
chus	—	when	he	provides	them	with	reasons	why,	roughly,	the	life	of	
philosophy	is	better	than	the	life	of	politics	—	he	meets	with	stubborn-
ness	 and	 defensiveness.	 None	 are	 persuaded.	 Importantly,	 these	 in-
terlocutors	are	among	Socrates’	most	 intransigent.	Equally	as	 impor-
tant,	 they	are	 the	only	 interlocutors	whose	conceptions	of	 the	good	
Socrates	attempts	to	change	directly.29	Most	often	he	aims	to	convince	
his	 interlocutors	 only	 that	 they	 are	 ignorant	 about	 virtue.	 However,	
even	 if	 successful,	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 why	 this	 would	 unsettle	 their	
conception	of	the	good.	A	person	can	realize	that	he	is	ignorant	about	
virtue	without	that	at	all	causing	him	to	lose	confidence	in	his	belief	
about	what	the	good	is.30
29.	 In	each	case,	Socrates	specifies	that	the	topic	in	dispute	is	the	best	way	to	live.	
To	Polus:	“…	the	heart	of	the	matter	is	that	of	recognizing	or	failing	to	recog-
nize	who	is	happy	and	who	is	not”	(Grg. 472c–d).	To	Callicles:	the	disagree-
ment	 concerns	 “the	 way	 we’re	 supposed	 to	 live”	 (Grg. 500c),	 and	 Socrates’	
explicit	goal	 is	 to	 convince	him	 to	 “choose	 the	orderly	 life”	 (Grg. 493c).	To	
Thrasymachus:	the	dispute	is	about	“which	whole	way	of	life	would	make	liv-
ing	the	most	worthwhile	for	each	of	us”	(Rep. 1.344e).	With	no	other	interlocu-
tors	is	the	goal	so	overtly	and	directly	to	change	their	strongly	held	beliefs	
about	what	constitutes	the	happy	life.	
30.	He	simply	may	not	care	that	he	is	ignorant	about	what	virtue	is	(as	a	whole	
or	any	specific	virtue):	so	long	as	he	is	convinced	that	he	is	pursuing	what	is	
good,	e.g.,	wealth,	then	he	can	rest	easy.	Or	perhaps	he	does	care,	and,	after	
investigating	further,	it	comes	to	seem	to	him	that	virtue	is	such	that	being	
virtuous	 is	 incompatible	 with	 acquiring	 the	 good	 as	 he	 sees	 it.	 But	 that	 is	
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a	perceptual	or	affective	experience.33	 I	shall	argue	that	this	 is	exact-
ly	what	Socrates	aims	 to	cause	 in	his	 interlocutors,	but	not	at	all	by	
means	 that	 we	 would	 regard	 as	 mystical	 or	 mysterious.	 He	 aims	 to	
cause	 it	—	or,	more	specifically,	 to	provide	 the	occasion	 for	 it	 to	hap-
pen	—	by	motivating	his	interlocutors	to	keep	doing	philosophy.	
In	the	next	section,	I	consider	how	doing	philosophy	could	cause	
such	 an	 experience.	 First,	 we	 need	 to	 inquire	 further	 into	 Socrates’	
typical	activities.	
If	the	above	argument	is	at	all	correct,	then	Socrates,	to	convert	his	
interlocutors,	must	not	contest	 the	values	 that	 they	 regard	as	 funda-
mental,	while	somehow	still	affecting	them	such	that	they	move	a	step	
closer	to	valuing	wisdom	the	most.	As	it	happens,	that	is	exactly	what	
we	often	observe	him	doing,	or	in	any	case	trying	to	do.	
To	start,	consider	Socrates’	tactic	in	the	Phaedrus.	Socrates’	avowed	
aim	is	to	convince	Phaedrus	that	“unless	he	pursues	philosophy	prop-
erly	 he	 will	 never	 be	 able	 to	 make	 a	 proper	 speech	 on	 any	 subject	
either”	(261a).	He	thus	presents	doing	philosophy	as	valuable	for	the	
sake	 of	 Phaedrus’	 acquiring	 rhetorical	 expertise.	 Socrates	 makes	 a	
similar	 move	 in	 the	 Alcibiades.	 He	 convinces	 Alcibiades	 that,	 unless	
he	gains	self-knowledge,	no	fame	or	influence	will	ever	come	to	him,	
thus	 motivating	 Alcibiades,	 like	 Phaedrus,	 to	 do	 philosophy	 for	 the	
sake	 of	 an	 external	 result	 that	 he	 highly	 prizes.	 So	 too	 in	 the	 Lysis:	
Socrates	presents	wisdom	as	useful	for	Hippothales	insofar	as	gaining	
it	will	increase	his	chances	of	wooing	Lysis	(210d–e),	for	Lysis	insofar	
as	gaining	it	will	convince	his	parents	to	allow	him	to	do	whatever	he	
pleases	(207d–210c).	In	all	of	these	cases,	Socrates	leaves	fixed	what	
be	successful,	must	“appea[l]	to	something	in	the	audience’s	existing	motiva-
tional	make-up”	—	such	as	what	she	currently	values	—	and	in	certain	cases,	
there	is	nothing	to	which	one	can	appeal	that	will	do	the	desired	work.	
33.	 One	might	suspect	that	such	experiences	are	wholly	out	of	place	in	Platonic	
philosophy.	But	see	Republic 9.582a,	where	Plato	places	experience	(empeiria)	
alongside	reason	(phronēsis)	and	argument	(logos)	as	the	things	by	which	we	
should	judge,	if	we	are	to	judge	well.	See	also	Edmonds	III	2017	for	a	reading	
of	the	ascent	in	the	Symposium	where	the	catalyst	for	change	is	not	the	learn-
ing	of	some	articulable	doctrine	but	rather	a	revelatory	experience.
What	 else	 can	 be	 done?	 What	 would	 it	 mean	 to	 experience	 a	
conversion	 here	—	here,	 where	 rational	 persuasion	 no	 longer	 seems	
viable?32	One	natural	answer	 is	 that	what	would	change	a	person	 is	
is	what	Republic 9	describes:	the	interlocutor	uses	what	he	values	the	most	
as	 his	 instrument	 of	 evaluative	 judgment,	 thus	 blocking	 off	 the	 possibility	
of	judging	something	on	the	basis	of	reasons	to	be	more	valuable	than	it	(cf.	
the	 phenomenon	 of	 “biased	 assimilation	 effect”	 in	 Lord,	 Ross,	 and	 Lepper	
1979	and	Corner,	Whitmarsh,	and	Xenias	2012).	This	view	does	not	require	
that	reason	(as	a	faculty	or	as	a	part	of	the	soul)	is	incapable	of	deciding	on	
its	own	what	is	of	ultimate	value.	It	requires	only	that	deductive	reasoning	is.	
For	a	view	that	closely	resembles	the	one	that	I	ascribe	to	Plato,	see	Frankfurt	
2004:	 23–26	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 Frankfurt	 1992:	 15–16.	 It	 is	 interesting	
to	note	that	 the	problem	of	evaluative	 inertia	can	arise	both	 in	contexts	of	
value	subjectivism	(as	with	Frankfurt)	and	value	objectivism	(as	with	Plato).	
There	are	ways	to	avoid	the	problem,	but	each	requires	supposing	that	people	
settle	questions	about	what	is	valuable	in	ways	other	than	Plato	suggests	in	
Republic	9.	For	example,	one	can	imagine	settling	this	question	by	first	agree-
ing	that	the	good	must	meet	certain	independent	criteria,	and	then	arguing	
that	some	particular	activity	or	object	of	pursuit	best	meets	those	criteria	(cf.	
Phil. 20b–22c,	Nicomachean Ethics 1.7).	For	this	strategy	to	succeed,	however,	
one	must	hold	fast	to	the	initial	agreement,	even	when	it	leads	to	a	result	that	
conflicts	with	one’s	prior	conviction	about	the	good,	and	Plato	seems	to	think	
that,	of	all	one’s	beliefs,	it	is	one’s	belief	about	what	the	good	is	that	one	holds	
most	strongly	(and	thus	clings	to	when	other	beliefs	conflict	with	it).	Another	
strategy	is	to	deploy	a	debunking	argument	—	to	argue,	e.g.,	that	a	person’s	
belief	about	what	is	valuable	is	overly	influenced	by	her	upbringing	or	soci-
ety.	Such	an	argument,	however,	does	not	aim	to	instill	new	values	but	only	
to	disrupt	what	a	person	currently	values	(the	only	debunking	arguments	in	
the	corpus	that	I	know	of,	interestingly,	are	made	by	Socrates’	interlocutors:	
see	Grg. 482e–484c,	Rep. 1.338c–339a,	and	Rep. 1.343b–334c).	An	alternative	
is	to	use	a	perceptual	or	affective	experience	to	persuade	someone	to	change	
what	she	values	the	most.	I	argue	that,	indeed,	this	is	Plato’s	and	Socrates’	so-
lution	to	the	problem	of	evaluative	inertia,	though,	importantly,	one	is	meant	
to	undergo	the	experience	by	doing	philosophy.	
32.	 Cf.	McDowell	1998:	“[It	is	a]	massively	implausible	implication	that	someone	
who	has	not	been	properly	brought	up	…	can	be	induced	into	seeing	things	
straight	by	directing	some	piece	of	reasoning	at	him.	On	the	contrary,	reason-
ing	aimed	at	generating	new	motivations	will	surely	stand	a	chance	of	work-
ing	 only	 if	 it	 appeals	 to	 something	 in	 the	 audience’s	 existing	 motivational	
make-up	…	and	the	trouble	…	is	that	there	may	be	no	such	point	of	leverage	
for	reasoning	aimed	at	generating	the	motivations	that	are	characteristic	of	
someone	who	has	been	properly	brought	up.	What	it	would	take	to	get	such	a	
person	to	consider	the	relevant	matters	aright,	we	might	plausibly	suppose,	is	
…	something	like	conversion”	(101–102).	Similarly,	I	have	argued	that	trying	
to	reform	a	person	whose	values	are	fundamentally	mistaken	by	“directing	
some	piece	of	reasoning	at	him”	 looks	 to	be	 futile,	since	such	reasoning,	 to	
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A	similar	account	can	be	given	for	any	refutation	that	occurs	in	pub-
lic	and	concerns	a	topic	that	the	interlocutor	must	know	to	perform	his	
social	 role	 well	 (thus	 including	 refutations	 of	 Critias	 in	 the	 Charmi-
des;	Laches	and	Nicias	in	the	Laches;	Ion	in	the	Ion;	Euthydemus	and	
Dionysodorus	in	the	Euthydemus;	Hippias	in	the	Hippias Minor;	Meno	
in	the	Meno;	and	Gorgias	in	the	Gorgias).	Refutations	in	private	—	for	
example,	of	Euthyphro	in	the	Euthyphro	—	work	in	like	manner,	except	
that,	due	to	the	absence	of	onlookers,	the	interlocutor’s	social	standing	
is	less	vulnerable.	If	he	is	to	be	motivated	to	do	more	philosophy,	it	is	
his	self-esteem	that	must	provide	it.
Socrates’	immediate	aim	with	many	of	his	interlocutors,	then,	is	to	
motivate	them	to	pursue	wisdom	only	for	its	instrumental	value.	He	
does	not	contest	what	they	care	about	(e.g.,	rhetorical	expertise,	social	
standing).	He	leaves	that	fixed,	and	he	persuades	them	that,	to	stand	
in	a	better	relation	to	it,	they	must	do	philosophy.	Of	course,	there	is	
more	 to	 be	 said	 in	 each	 case.	 I	 have	 shown	 only	 how	 a	 fuller	 argu-
ment	might	go,	 i.e.,	an	argument	that	considers	exegetical	details	at	
length.35	I	want	to	emphasize,	though,	that	Socrates’	limiting	his	aim	
to	motivating	just	the	instrumental pursuit	of	wisdom	is	exactly	what	
he	should be	doing,	if,	as	I	argued,	a	more	ambitious,	direct	approach	
is	likely	to	fail.	
On	my	account,	then,	Socrates	is	doing	what	he	should be	doing.36 
It	is	not,	however,	as	if	motivating	people	to	pursue	wisdom	just	for	its	
wisdom.	This	point	is	compatible	with	the	view	that	Plato	thought	highly	of	
Protagoras.	
35.	 In	any	case,	the	point	that	Socrates	aims	to	motivate	his	interlocutors	to	pur-
sue	wisdom	as	a	means	 is	supported	by	accounts	on	which	Socrates	 is	 try-
ing	to	shame	his	interlocutors,	thereby	motivating	them	to	undertake	further	
philosophical	inquiry	as	a	means	to	rectifying	their	shameful	condition.	See,	
e.g.,	Brickhouse	and	Smith	1994:	25	and	2000:	58–59.	
36.	At	least	most	of	the	time.	In	the	Gorgias and	Republic 1,	Plato	depicts	him	try-
ing	a	more	ambitious,	direct	approach	—	on	my	account,	a	mistaken	strategy.	
My	 account	 thus	 implies	 that	 Socrates	 does	 not	 always	 behave	 in	 the	 way	
most	 advantageous	 to	 converting	 his	 interlocutors.	 Plato	 nonetheless	 had	
good	reason	to	depict	Socrates	behaving	in	this	way.	It	dramatizes	the	prob-
lem	of	evaluative	inertia,	and	thus	fills	out	the	explanation	for	why	Socrates	
tends	to	adopt	a	more	sophisticated,	indirect	strategy.	
his	interlocutor	fundamentally	values	—	rhetorical	expertise,	fame	and	
influence,	a	relationship	with	Lysis,	and	the	ability	to	do	whatever	he	
pleases	—	and	focuses	the	entirety	of	his	efforts	solely	on	convincing	
the	interlocutor	that,	to	get	what	he	wants,	he	needs	to	begin	doing	
philosophy.	
In	other	cases,	Socrates	aims	to	damage	something	that	his	 inter-
locutors	care	about,	in	such	a	way	that,	to	repair	it,	they	must	do	phi-
losophy.	 I	mean	 for	 this	 to	cover	 typical	 cases	of	Socratic	 refutation.	
Consider,	 for	 example,	 Socrates’	 refutation	 of	 Protagoras.	 Socrates	
shows	Protagoras	to	be	ignorant	of	how	virtue	is	teachable	and	what	
virtue	is	(333a–b,	361a–c).	Importantly,	these	are	not	just	any	old	top-
ics.	They	are	topics	that	especially Protagoras ought	to	know,	given	his	
claim	to	teach	virtue	(318d–320c).	When	he	is	shown	not to	know	them,	
it	impugns	his	credibility	as	a	reliable	educator.	Meanwhile	potential	
students	 and	 colleagues	 look	 on.	 Protagoras’	 social	 standing	 would	
thus	be	lowered	—	so,	too,	his	self-esteem,	to	the	extent	that	he	takes	
pride	in	being	a	competent	educator	(and	not	just	in	having	a	reputa-
tion	as	such).	In	turn,	he	would	be	motivated	to	raise	his	social	stand-
ing	and	self-esteem.	Moreover,	since	his	 ignorance	of	virtue	 is	what	
caused	these	to	be	lowered,	the	way	to	raise	them	would	be	to	acquire	
the	knowledge	that	he	was	shown	to	lack.	Thus,	by	refuting	Protago-
ras,	Socrates	gives	him	a	reason	to	strive	to	attain	wisdom	(in	this	case,	
knowledge	of	virtue)	right	now,	namely	that	doing	so	is	instrumentally	
valuable	for	repairing	the	things	that	he	cares	about.34
34.	 One	might	suspect	 that	Protagoras	already	stands	 in	the	proper	relation	to	
wisdom	—	he	 is,	after	all,	a	 self-professed	 teacher	of	virtue	who	 thinks	 that	
“wisdom	and	knowledge	are	…	the	most	powerful	forces	in	human	activity”	
(352d)	—	and	thus	that	Socrates	cannot	really	be	trying	to	motivate	him	to	val-
ue	wisdom	more.	But	Protagoras’	behavior	in	the	dialogue	betrays	him.	When	
he	first	senses	that	Socrates	has	exposed	him	in	an	inconsistency,	he	tries	to	
exit	 the	discussion;	he	 “plays	coy,	 claiming	 the	argument	was	 too	hard	 for	
him	to	handle”	(333d).	Later,	he	refuses	to	discuss	matters	by	means	of	brief	
questions	and	answers,	claiming	that,	if	he	were	to	do	so,	it	would	tarnish	his	
reputation	as	“a	name	to	be	reckoned	with	among	the	Greeks”	(335a).	This	
is	not	the	behavior	of	someone	who	values	wisdom	the	most.	It	resembles	
more	the	behavior	of	someone	who	values	the	appearance	or	reputation	for	
	 jacob	stump On Socrates’ Project of Philosophical Conversion
philosophers’	imprint	 –		12		– vol.	20,	no.	32	(november	2020)
to	motivate	his	interlocutors,	at	first,	to	just start doing philosophy,	what-
ever	it	takes.39 
In	the	next	section,	I	explore	one	answer	as	to	what	would	cause	
such	a	conversion.	First,	I	want	to	offer	a	point	of	reentry	to	my	overall	
argument	for	anyone	inclined	to	doubt	my	claim	above	that	typically	
Socrates	tries	to	motivate	his	interlocutors	to	pursue	wisdom	just	for	
its	 instrumental	value.	I	began	by	observing	that,	as	scholars	widely	
recognize,	there	is	not	one	unambiguous	instance	in	Plato’s	corpus	of	
Socrates’	radically	reforming	his	interlocutor’s	way	of	life	by	the	end	of	
any	dialogue.	In	every	case,	it	seems	as	if	the	interlocutor’s	fundamen-
tal	values	are	unchanged.	But	Socrates	consistently	urges	his	interloc-
utors to	keep doing philosophy.40	We	can	thus	ask	a	question	similar	to	
the	one	above:	What	is	it	about	doing	more	philosophy	that	Socrates	
expects	to	be	transformative?	What	is	it	about	doing	more	philosophy	
that	Socrates	expects	to	cause	his	interlocutors	to	come	to	value	wis-
dom	the	most	—	especially when,	as	I	have	argued,	they	will	seemingly	
never	do	so	on	the	basis	of	reasons	in	support	of	wisdom’s	ultimate	
value?	
3. Pleasure and the good
In	the	previous	section,	 I	argued	that	Plato	depicts	Socrates	 limiting	
his	behavior:	despite	wanting	ultimately	to	convert	his	 interlocutors	
to	valuing	wisdom	the	most,	Socrates	typically	attempts	to	persuade	
them	only	of	wisdom’s	instrumental	value,	i.e.,	he	does	not	aim	directly	
or	immediately	for	his	goal.	If	this	is	not	simply	a	mistake	on	Socrates’	
part,	 then	 something	 must	 explain	 it.	 What	 explains	 it,	 I	 argued,	 is	
the	 problem	 of	 evaluative	 inertia.	 In	 reasoning	 about	 what	 to	 value,	
people	use	what	they	currently	value	the	most	as	their	evaluative	stan-
dard,	judging	things	to	be	valuable	in	the	end	based	on	whether	they	
39.	Cf.	the	example	in	MacIntyre	2007:	188	of	the	child	who,	initially	motivated	to	
play	chess	only	by	the	promise	of	candy,	eventually,	by	playing	chess,	comes	
to	value	it	for	itself.	
40.	See,	e.g.,	Euthyphr. 15c,	Charm. 169d,	Laches 194a	and	201a,	Prot. 314b	and 361d,	
H. Ma. 295a–b,	Grg. 461b,	and	Euthyd. 288c.	
instrumental	value	is	Socrates’	ultimate	aim	—	it	is	not	as	if	that is	what	
he	means	by	saying	that	he	“go[es]	around	doing	nothing	other	than	
persuading	both	young	and	old	among	you	not	to	care	for	your	body	
or	your	wealth	in	preference	to	or	as	strongly	as	the	best	possible	state	
of	your	soul”	(Ap. 30a–b).37	No,	what	he	wants	is	to	transform	the	values	
of	his	interlocutors	—	as	I	put	it	above,	to	cause	them	to	value	wisdom,	
the	 best	 possible	 state	 of	 their	 souls,	 more	 than	 anything	 else.	 The	
question,	then,	is	this:	How	can	pursuing	wisdom	only	for	its	instru-
mental	value	lead	to	valuing	it	the	most?	How	can	doing	philosophy	
for	the	sake	of	advancing	one’s	career,	or	for	the	sake	of	repairing	one’s	
social	standing,	or	for	the	sake	of	wooing	an	attractive	boy,	or	in	any	
case	for	the	sake	of	some	exterior,	non-philosophical	goal	—	how	can	
doing	philosophy	for	the	sake	of	that cause	one	to	come	to	dedicate	
one’s	life	to	wisdom,	to	value	it	the	most?	
It	is	worth	noting	that	the	structure	of	this	question	is	familiar.	It	is	
a	question	of	how	the	means	can	become	the	end.38	It	is	worth	noting,	
too,	that,	however	this	may	happen,	it	frequently	does	happen	in	the	
philosophy	classroom.	For	the	sake	of	satisfying	a	curricular	require-
ment,	a	student	takes	a	philosophy	course,	and,	by	the	end	of	it,	she	
finds	that	her	priorities	are	transformed,	such	that	she	is	now	strongly	
motivated	to	gain	something	like	philosophical	wisdom,	just	for	itself.	
This	phenomenon	is	so	common	that	the	observation	of	it	may	seem	
banal.	But	its	reality	suggests	that	Socrates	is	not	misguided	in	trying	
37.	 Is	this	claim	in	tension	with	what,	I	have	argued,	Socrates	in	fact	often	does,	
i.e.,	allow	people	to	continue	caring	the	most	about	their	bodies	or	wealth	
while	 convincing	 them	 that	 they	 should	 care	 more	 about	 their	 souls	 as	 in	
some	way	a	means	to	them?	No,	I	think,	if	we	accept	that	persuasion	(peithōn, 
Ap. 30a8)	can	happen	in	stages,	such	that	I	can	be	considered	to	be	persuad-
ing	you	of	x	even	if	my	immediate	aim	is	only	to	persuade	you	of	y,	so	long	as	
I	am	persuading	you	of	y so	that	eventually	you	will	come	to	believe	x.	
38.	More	specifically,	how	the	means	can	become	the	end	in	a	context	where	the	
end	would	not	be	chosen	for	itself.	For	a	useful	discussion	of	mental	states	
that	 can	 be	 brought	 about	 only	 as	 “by-products	 of	 actions	 undertaken	 for	
other	ends”,	see	Elster	1983:	43–60.	
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change:	 a	 person’s	 motivations	 could	 change	 in	 this	 way	 without	 it	
reshaping	what	he	fundamentally	values.	
The	next	step,	then,	is	to	note	that	Plato	thinks	that	pleasurable	ex-
periences	have	the	psychological	effect	not	only	of	causing	us	pleasure.	
They	also	influence	our	beliefs	about	the	good.	In	the	Gorgias,	Socrates	
claims	that	most	people	would	judge	a	pastry	chef	to	know	better	than	
a	doctor	which	 foods	are	 “beneficial”	 (χρηστός,	 464d7).	Why	 is	 that?	
No	direct	explanation	is	in	the	text,	but	the	salient	fact	about	pastry	
baking	is	that	it	causes	great	pleasure:	it	“captivates	with	what	is	most	
pleasant	in	the	moment”	(464d).	What	seems	to	explain	it,	then,	is	that	
most	 people	 operate	 with	 a	 certain	 psychological	 tendency,	 namely	
the	tendency,	when	something	causes	them	pleasure,	to	believe	that	it	
is	good.	Just	because	his	pastries	cause	them	pleasure,	people	wrongly	
believe	that	the	pastry	chef	knows	which	foods	are	beneficial.43 
This	 psychological	 tendency	 appears	 also	 in	 the	 Phaedo. Socrates	
claims	 that,	 when	 we	 experience	 “strong	 pleasure	 or	 pain”,	 we	 are	
“compelled	to	believe	[ἀναγκάζεται	…	ἡγεῖσθαι]	at	the	same	time	that	
what	causes	such	feelings	must	be	very	clear	[ἐναργέστατόν]	and	very	
true	 [ἀληθέστατον]”	 (Phd. 83c5–8).	 Now,	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 object	 is	
also	 good is	 not	 mentioned,	 but	 that	 is	 unsurprising:	 Socrates’	 point	
is	about	what	is	common	to	experiences	of	pleasure	and pain.	In	the	
case	 of	 pleasure,	 however,	 it	 is	 highly	 plausible	 that	 the	 experience	
would	instill	also	the	belief	that	the	object	causing	it	is	good.	Socrates’	
concern	in	the	context	is	with	the	beliefs	that	influence	our	habits	and	
ways	 of	 life	 (cf.	 ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος,	 83d8–9)	—	that	 is,	 with	
beliefs	about	the	good.	This	detail	clarifies	Socrates’	point	regarding	
of	 the	 practice,	 and	 they	 can	 be	 evaluated	 well	 only	 by	 people	 who	 have	
achieved	them	before.
43.	 See	similar	remarks	on	this	passage	by	Moss	2007:	 “…	most	people	 fail	 to	
distinguish	between	what	 is	pleasant	and	what	 is	good	for	them.	…	When	
they	experience	pleasure,	they	believe	that	they	are	being	benefited	…	they	
confuse	the	state	of	being	pleased	with	the	state	of	being	in	good	condition”	
(30–31).	See	also	Moss	2006:	“[The	pastries]	appear	to	be	good,	simply	be-
cause	they	are	pleasant;	when	someone	pleases	us,	we	think	he	is	doing	us	
good”	(513).
promote	standing	in	a	better	relation	to	it,	e.g.,	acquiring	more	of	it	or	
being	closer	to	it.	Thus,	people	will	not	reason	that	something	is	more	
valuable	than	what	they	currently	value	the	most.	If	Socrates	is	to	have	
any	 success	 in	 converting	 his	 interlocutors,	 then,	 he	 cannot	 rely	 on	
them	to	draw	the	inference	that	their	fundamental	values	are	mistaken.	
At	first,	this	claim	appears	to	be	in	tension	with	Socrates’	habit	of	
encouraging	his	interlocutors	to	keep	doing	philosophy	—	in	tension,	
too,	 with	 his	 confidence	 that	 further	 arguments	 will	 succeed	 at	 per-
suading	 interlocutors	 who	 seem	 to	 be	 intransigent	 (Grg. 513c–d).	 If	
procedures	of	evaluative	reasoning	block	a	person	from	inferring	that	
his	current	set	of	values	is	mistaken,	then	how	is	doing	more	philoso-
phy	to	be	effective	at	converting	him?	In	this	section,	I	argue	that	it	can	
be	effective	not by	leading	a	person	to	infer	that	he	must	change	his	
way	of	life	but	rather	by	causing	the	experience	of	intellectual	pleasure,	
an	experience	capable	of	reshaping	a	person’s	evaluative	beliefs.	
To	start,	Plato	thinks	that	doing	philosophy	causes	more	pleasure	
than	any	other	activity.	In	Republic	9,	Socrates	ranks	the	pleasures	of	
the	philosopher,	lover	of	honor,	and	lover	of	money.	He	concludes:	“of	
the	three	pleasures,	the	most	pleasant	[ἡ ἡδίστη]	is	that	of	the	part	of	
the	soul	with	which	we	learn,	and	the	one	in	whom	that	part	rules	[i.e.,	
the	philosopher]	has	the	most	pleasant	life	[ὁ βίος ἥδιστος]”	(583a1–3).41 
Plato	depicts	Apollodorus	testifying	to	this	fact	in	the	Symposium:	“my	
greatest	pleasure	comes	from	philosophical	conversations”	(173c).	
Now,	 experiencing	 the	 pleasure	 of	 philosophy	 could	 motivate	 a	
person	to	do	it	no	longer	only	for	the	sake	of	an	external	good,	e.g.,	a	
reputation	for	intelligence,	but	also	for	the	sake	of	an	internal	good,	i.e.,	
the	pleasure	of philosophy.42	However,	that	would	fall	short	of	radical	
41.	 Russell	 2005:	 134	 argues	 that	 Socrates’	 conclusion	 is	 only	 about	 “lives	 as	
wholes”	and	not	“pleasant	characteristic	episodes”	(cf.	Annas	1981:	308–309).	
But	it	is	about	both:	the	most	pleasant	pleasure	(ἡ …	ἡδίστη	[ἡδονή])	and	the	
most	pleasant	life	(ὁ	…	βίος ἥδιστος).	
42.	 See	MacIntyre	2007:	188–191	for	discussion	of	 internal	and	external	goods.	
External	goods	are	only	contingently	attached	to	a	practice,	and	they	can	be	
achieved	by	alternative	routes.	Internal	goods	are	specifiable	only	in	terms	
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to	experience	the	most pleasure,	 the	activity	of	philosophy	would	in-
still	in	them	the	belief	that	it	is	best,	i.e.,	more	valuable	than	anything	
else.46 
What	 we	 wanted,	 though,	 was	 to	 know	 how	 doing	 philosophy	
could	cause	someone	to	value wisdom	the	most.	There	are	two	points	
here:	that	the	goal	 is	valuing	 (epimeleisthai;	cf.	Ap. 29d–30b,	31b,	and	
36c)	and	that	specifically	it	is	valuing	wisdom. All	I	have	concluded	so	
far	is	that	doing	philosophy	could	cause	a	person	to	believe	that	philoso-
phy	is	most	valuable.	But	believing	is	not	valuing:	I	believe	that	space	
exploration	is	valuable,	but	I	do	not	value	it,	at	least	not	in	any	way	that	
has	a	significant	influence	on	my	life.47	And	philosophy	is	not	wisdom:	
conceivably,	I	could	highly	value	doing	philosophy	—	highly	value	the	
activity,	say,	of	navigating	conceptual	territory	—	without	valuing	wis-
dom	all	that	much.	What	I	value	would	be	the	activity,	and	the	activity	
can	come	apart	 from	 its	aim.	Likewise,	 I	might	highly	value	playing	
chess	without	caring	all	that	much	about	whether	I	win.	
Nevertheless,	in	typical	cases,	one	values	the	aim	of	an	activity	just	
as	much	as	the	activity	itself	(and	sometimes	even	more	so:	“what	I	re-
ally	want	is	to	win”).	Further,	in	Republic 9,	what	in	particular	seems	to	
cause	the	greatest	pleasure	is	not	just	doing	philosophy	but	succeeding 
at	it,	i.e.,	learning:	“the	most	pleasant	[pleasure]	is	that	of	the	part	of	
the	soul	with	which	we	learn”.	If	so,	then	it	is wisdom	that	the	pleasure	
from	doing	philosophy	would	cause	one	to	believe	is	most	important.	
As	for	the	transition	from	believing to	valuing,	it	is	again	the	default	to	
value	what	you	believe	is	important	—	to	shape	your	life	by	it	in	some	
way.	Of	course,	in	some	cases	that	will	be	impossible	(I	am	not	really	
believe	it	is	good	in	proportion	to	how	pleasurable	it	is.	Cf.	the	correlation	in	
the	Phaedo passage	of	“strong pleasure	or	pain”	with	“very clear	and	very true”.	
46.	 For	discussion	of	how	and	why	philosophy	causes	the	most	pleasure,	see	es-
pecially	Philebus 51e–53c	and	Republic 9.585b–586b.	
47.	 Cf.	Helm	2001:	71.	Similarly,	to	transition	back	to	the	Greek,	one	can	believe	
that	something	is	important	without	qualifying	as	epimeleisthai-ing	it.	Presum-
ably,	Meletus	believes,	as	he	avows	(Ap. 24d),	that	the	education	of	the	youth	
is	important;	but	he	is	shown	not	to	epimeleisthai it	(Ap. 24c–25c).	See	Memo-
rabilia 2.4.2–4	for	epimeleisthai	functioning	similarly	in	Xenophon.	
pleasure:	when	a	person	experiences	strong	pleasure,	that	experience	
instills	in	her	the	belief	that	what	causes	the	pleasure	is	very	clear,	very	
true,	and	very	good.44
In	the	Laws,	a	similar	psychological	tendency	is	made	explicit:	“we	
feel	pleasure	whenever	we	believe	 that	we	are	doing	well,	 and	 like-
wise,	whenever	we	feel	pleasure,	we	believe	 that	we	are	doing	well	
[ὁπόταν χαίρωμεν, οἰόμεθα εὖ πράττειν αὖ]”	(657c).	Here	again	Plato	ad-
vances	the	thought	that	pleasure	influences	our	evaluative	beliefs.	It	is	
not	said	that	pleasure	instills	in	us	the	belief	that	what	causes	it	is	good,	
but	that	is	implicit:	if	we	believe	that	we	are	doing	well	whenever	we	
feel	pleasure,	then	we	must	believe	that	what	causes	the	pleasure	ben-
efits	us.
Now,	in	the	Gorgias and	Phaedo,	Socrates	laments	the	psychological	
tendency	that,	whenever	something	causes	people	pleasure,	they	be-
lieve	it	to	be	good.	But	this	tendency	is	just	as	capable	of	turning	peo-
ple	in	the	right	direction	as	leading	them	astray.	Moreover,	it	explains	
how	the	experience	of	pleasure	from	doing	philosophy	can	transform	
one’s	fundamental	values	—	that	is,	how	philosophy	can	transform	one’s	
values,	though	not	by	leading	a	person	to	draw	a	conclusion	from	any	
premises.	Philosophy	can	cause	the	experience	of	pleasure,	and	there-
by	instill	the	belief	that	it	is	good.	But	we	can	go	a	step	further.	It	is	
a	 corollary	 of	 the	 psychological	 tendency	 in	 the	 Gorgias	 and	 Phaedo 
that,	when	something	causes	people	pleasure,	they	tend	to	believe	it	is	
good	in	proportion	to	how	pleasurable	it	is.45	Thus,	in	causing	people	
44.	 For	a	similar	interpretation,	see	Ebrey	2017:	“the	beliefs	caused	in	us	by	plea-
sure	and	pain	change	our	way	of	life	…	we	can	have	certain	beliefs	forced	on	
us	by	our	experiences	and	thereby	change	what	we	desire	and	how	we	act	
…	pleasures	change	which	things	we	think	are	good”	(7–8).	Cf.	Woolf	2004:	
the	“intensity	of	response”	is	a	“begetter”	of	“the	evaluative	stance one	adopts	
towards	the	relevant	sources”	(103).	
45.	 After	all,	Socrates’	point	in	the	Gorgias is	not	that	all	those	who	cause	at	least	
some pleasure	will	be	judged	to	know	equally as	much	about	what	is	good	and	
beneficial.	It	is	rather	that	causing	more pleasure	will	incline	people	to	judge	
that	you	know	 more about	what	 is	good	and	beneficial	 (thus	 the	choice	of	
the	pastry	baker,	who	is	responsible	for	causing	people	great	pleasure),	and	
what	explains	that	is	the	tendency,	when	something	causes	you	pleasure,	to	
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convert	them	by	getting	them	to	experience	the	pleasure	of	philosophy.	
Is	there	evidence	that	Plato	considered	this	experience	to	be	capable	
of	rightly	orienting	a	person?	
Yes.	 In	 the	 Phaedo,	 Socrates	 encourages	 “seriously	 concerning”	
(ἐσπούδασέ)	oneself	with	the	“pleasures	of	learning”	(ἡδονὰς …	τὰς	…	
περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν)	—	not	merely	with	learning,	but	with	the	pleasure	of	it	
(114e).	Why	is	the	pleasure	of	it	important?	Socrates	gives	no	explana-
tion,	so	we	are	left	to	find	one	elsewhere	in	the	text.	And	what	is	most	
salient	about	pleasure	elsewhere	in	the	text	is	that	one	should	avoid	
certain	instances	of	it	because	they	have	the	effect	of	distorting	one’s	
beliefs	and	way	of	life	(83b–e;	cf.	65a–67d).	What	is	most	salient,	that	
is,	is	that	pleasures	influence	what	we	believe	and	how	we	live.	If	we	
are	to	pursue	certain	pleasures,	then,	it	must	be	because	the	experience	
of	 those	 pleasures	 improves our	 beliefs	 and	 way	 of	 life	—	exactly	 the	
claim	that	we	are	concerned	to	secure.50 
I	do	not	mean	to	give	the	impression	that	Socrates’	strategy	of	con-
version	will	succeed	always	or	even	most	of	 the	 time.	One	problem	
threatens	it	in	particular	—	that	Socrates’	interlocutors	will	stop	doing	
philosophy	 too soon,	 e.g.,	 before	 they	 experience	 the	 sort	 of	 philo-
sophical	pleasure	 that	 can	be	 transformative.	Socrates	 is	well	aware	
of	this	danger.	He	laments	in	the	Theaetetus that	“many	people”,	after	
receiving	 some	 initial	 benefit	 from	 his	 company,	 leave	 him	 “sooner	
than	they	should,	either	of	their	own	accord	or	through	the	harmful	
influence	 of	 others”	 (150e).	 However,	 this	 is	 precisely	 why	 Socrates’	
appealing	 to	something	 that	his	 interlocutors	strongly	care	about	 to	
motivate	their	doing	philosophy	is	strategic.	It	gives	them	lasting	mo-
tivation,	thus	making	it	likely	that	they	will	persist.	
As	a	last	note,	it	is	worth	observing	that	converting	is	different	than	
fortifying	a	conversion.	To	fortify	one’s	conversion	to	valuing	wisdom	
the	 most,	 such	 that	 it	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 persist	 through	 hard	 times	
(e.g.,	times	when	pleasurable	experiences	are	not	so	readily	had),	one	
50.	It	is	worth	adding,	too,	that,	if	you	take	pleasure	in	learning,	you	will	be	likeli-
er	to	improve	at	it,	and	you	will	be	in	a	better	position	to	perceive	its	genuine	
value,	a	perception	that	itself	would	be	pleasurable.	
able	to	include	space	exploration	in	my	life),	but	in	most	cases	it	will	
be	a	natural	outgrowth	of	the	belief.
Now,	it	is	one	thing	to	say	that	pleasure	can	play	this	role	in	phil-
osophical	conversion,	another	to	say	that	Plato	 thinks	of	pleasure	as	
playing	 this	 role.	Here	we	might	hesitate.	Plato	 is	notoriously	 suspi-
cious	of	pleasure,	writing	that	the	true	philosopher	“keeps	away	from	
pleasures	…	as	far	as	he	can”	(Phd. 83b); that	pleasure	is	“evil’s	most	
powerful	 lure”	 (Tim. 69d);	 and that	 the	 life	 without	 pleasure	 is	 “the	
most	godlike”	(Phil. 33b).	Further,	in	the	Gorgias,	he	presents	pleasure	
as	an	unreliable	guide	to	value	(see	especially	464a–465d;	cf.	Phil. 65c:	
“pleasure	is	the	greatest	imposter	of	all”).
But	things	are	not	so	straightforward.	To	start,	it	is	not	as	if	pleasure	
is	 associated	 only	 ever	 with	 the	 merely	 apparent	 good:	 some	 genu-
inely	good	things	are	pleasurable,	and	the	best	life	for	humans,	Plato	
thinks,	will	involve	not	only	those	things	but	also	the	pleasure	of	them	
(Phil. 22a–b,	27d,	63d–64a).	More	 importantly,	Plato	 recognizes	 that	
pleasure	can	play	a	positive	role	in	convincing	someone	to	adopt	a	bet-
ter	way	of	life.	In	the	Laws,	he	writes	that	“nobody	would	willingly	be	
persuaded	to	do	[ἑκὼν ἐθέλοι πείθεσθαι πράττειν]	something	that	does	
not	cause	more	pleasure	than	pain”.48	He	then	recommends	that,	when	
trying	 “to	 persuade	 a	 man	 to	 live	 a	 just	 and	 pious	 life”,	 one	 should	
argue	that	it	is	more	pleasant	than	the	alternative	(663b).49	Thus,	Pla-
to	 considers	 it	 appropriate	 and	 strategic	 to	 exploit	 the	 motivational	
power	of	pleasure	when	trying	to	convert	a	person	to	a	new	way	of	life.	
On	 my	 view,	 though,	 Socrates	 is	 not	 trying	 to	 convince	 his	 inter-
locutors	that	the	life	of	philosophy	is	most	pleasurable.	He	is	trying	to	
48.	 See	Meyer	2015:	270–271	 for	discussion.	The	key	point	 is	 that	Plato	 is	not	
asserting	 psychological	 hedonism,	 but	 rather	 the	 weaker	 claim	 that	 a	 per-
son	will	not	willingly or	wholeheartedly (ἑκὼν ἐθέλοι)	be	persuaded	to	do	what	
causes	more	pain	overall	 (or	even	 an	equal	 amount	of	pleasure	and	pain).	
Thanks	to	Katy	Meadows	for	calling	my	attention	to	this	passage.
49.	 As	Bobonich	2002:	566	n.	95	rightly	notes,	“this	does	not	entail	that	pleasure	
is	the	only	(or	the	most	important)	feature	that	makes	[the	most	pleasant	life]	
good”.	It	may	be	that	experience	living	the	just	life	shows	a	person	that	actually	
what	makes	it	good	is	something	else	entirely.	Cf.	Paul	2014.	
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happens	 because	 of	 the	 pleasure	 of	 philosophy.53	 Thus,	 contrary	 to	
what	some	scholars	suppose,	argument	can	be	an	effective	tool	of	phil-
osophical	conversion,	in	at	least	two	distinct	ways:	it	can	spur	people	
to	do	more	philosophy;	and	it	can	cause	the	experience	of	intellectual	
pleasure,	thereby	reshaping	their	beliefs	about	the	good.	
As	 a	 last	 note,	 it	 is	 worth	 considering	 why	 Plato	 would	 have	 de-
picted	 Socrates	 employing	 such	 a	 strategy.	 I	 mentioned	 one	 reason	
already:	the	alternative,	i.e.,	a	direct	approach,	seems	likely	to	fail,	in	
part	due	to	the	problem	of	evaluative	inertia.	Thus,	Plato	is	motivated	
by	his	own	moral	psychology	to	consider	philosophical	conversion	to	
be	an	indirect	affair.	This	explanation	is	internal	to	the	dialogues,	but	I	
want	to	note	also	an	explanation	that	is	external	to	them.	It	requires	a	
bit	of	speculation.	One	of	the	few	historical	facts	that	we	know	about	
Plato	is	that	he	founded	a	school	of	sorts	that	later	became	known	as	
the	Academy.54	So,	it	is	plausible	—	here	is	the	speculative	part	—	that	
Plato	wanted	to	attract	students,	and	that	the	dialogues	were	meant	to	
function	 (among	 other	 things)	 as	 recruitment	 tools.55	 To	 recruit	 stu-
dents,	though,	Plato	would	not	have	needed	to	convince	his	readers	
that	wisdom	 is	of	 intrinsic	 value.	 It	would	 suffice	 to	 persuade	 them	
of	its	immense	instrumental	value	—	a	lesson	to	which	many	of	them	
53.	 Is	the	fact	that	Plato	never	depicts	this	second	stage	evidence	that,	in	the	end,	
he	is	pessimistic	about	philosophical	conversion?	I	do	not	think	so.	First,	it	is	
unclear	how	the	second	stage	could	be	depicted	(how	could	one	depict	that	
moment	 of	 transformation?).	 Second,	 it	 is	 implausible	 that,	 once	 an	 inter-
locutor	is	motivated	in	the	first	stage	to	continue	doing	philosophy,	merely	
a	second	conversation	would	suffice	to	be	transformative.	Likely	many	more	
would	be	needed,	and	it	may	be	that	Plato	did	not	wish	to	devote	the	requi-
site	time	and	energy	to	depicting	them.
54.	 It	is	remarkable,	though,	how	little	we	know	about	it	during	Plato’s	lifetime.	
Dillon	2003:	1–16	is	a	useful	starting	point	here.
55.	 Cf.	Kahn	1986:	“If	we	imagine	the	dialogues	read,	as	they	surely	were,	by	the	
young	men	themselves,	the	question	becomes:	what	kind	of	training	are	they	
to	pursue?	The	one	thing	Plato	cannot	be	saying	to	them	is	‘Go	study	philoso-
phy	with	Socrates’.	But	he	might	well	be	saying	‘Come	study	philosophy	with	
me’.	…	Why	should	he	not	want	to	attract	the	most	gifted	minds	to	come	as	
students	or	associates?”	 (10).	Consider	also	Themistius’	 remark	at	Orations 
23.295	that	Axiothea	of	Phlius,	upon	reading	the	Republic,	came	to	study	with	
Plato,	and	likewise	with	the	Corinthian	farmer	and	the	Gorgias. 
should	grasp	how	and	why	 wisdom	 is	 supremely	valuable.	But	 that	
is	no	more	required	for	converting	to	valuing	wisdom	the	most	than	
grasping	how	and	why	a	person	is	so	valuable	is	required	to	start	valu-
ing	them	the	most,	e.g.,	to	fall	in	love	with	them.	In	both	the	ancient	
Greek	 and	 contemporary	 contexts,	 to	 value	 something	 is	 to	 believe	
that	it	is	important	and,	motivated	by	that	belief,	to	act	on	behalf	of	it	
and	pay	attention	to	it.51	It	is	thus	possible	to	begin	valuing	something	
the	most	without	fully	understanding	why	it	is	so	important.52 
4. Conclusion
Conversion	is	never	a	matter	of	certainty.	One	can	never	be	sure	that,	
if	a	person	is	told	some	claim,	or	if	she	has	some	experience,	she	will	
respond	to	it	by	reforming	her	way	of	life.	But	that	is	compatible	with	
supposing	that	some	tactics	are	better	able	to	accomplish	it	than	oth-
ers.	When	it	comes	to	converting	his	interlocutors	to	a	life	dedicated	
to	wisdom,	I	have	argued	that	Socrates’	typical	strategy	is	designed	to	
avoid	as	much	as	possible	arousing	in	his	interlocutors	the	defensive-
ness	 and	 stubbornness	 that	 is	 often	 caused	 by	 directly	 contesting	 a	
person’s	values.	His	strategy	is	best	understood	as	consisting	of	two	
stages.	 In	 the	 first,	 Socrates	 exploits	 his	 interlocutor’s	 concern	 with	
some	external,	non-philosophical	goal	(e.g.,	rhetorical	expertise,	pow-
er,	social	status)	to	motivate	him	to	take	up	philosophy	as	a	means	to	
it.	This	 is	 the	stage	 that	Plato	depicts	 in	many	dialogues.	 In	 the	sec-
ond,	this	instrumental	pursuit	is	meant	to	cause	a	transformation	after	
which	the	interlocutor	values	wisdom	the	most,	a	transformation	that	
51.	 See	 especially	 Ap. 24d–25c	 and	 Tht. 167e	 in	 Plato;	 and	 Mem. 1.2.22,	 Mem. 
2.4.2–4,	Sym. 8.25,	Cyr. 8.8.8–9,	and	Cyr. 8.8.19	in	Xenophon.	For	valuing	in	
the	contemporary	context,	see	Helm	2001:	71–86	and	99–106	and	Frankfurt	
1998:	82–85.	
52.	 It	is	reasonable	to	expect,	however,	that,	given	that	valuing	requires	attention,	
a	person	will	be	required	eventually to	grasp	how	and	why	the	relevant	object	
is	valuable,	since,	if	she	fails	to	do	so	even	after	considerable	time,	then	that	is	
evidence	that	she	has	not	been	attending	to	it,	and	thus	has	not	been	valuing	
it.	
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